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I am delighted to be back in Columbus for semantics in the spring. Twenty-
three years ago, when I was here on a similar occasion, on the very first evening 
of my life spent in the Midwest, I was stopped, frisked, and interrogated by an 
officer of the law for suspicion of being outside in downtown Columbus and 
possession of long hair. When I explained I was in town for the First Annual 
Spring Semantics Festival, the policeman seemed unimpressed. Columbus has 
clearly matured since 1969, and so have studies in linguistic semantics. I'm not 
so sure about me. 
I have come to live with the fact that the exciting new (or at least only 
slightly used) way of looking at scalar predicates I developed in my thesis (Horn 
1972) is now ritually trotted out, en route to being dismissed, as the 'classical', 
'orthodox', 'traditional', or 'standard' neo-Gricean line, a fact which-<:ombined 
with the fact that it's also taken as embodying the 'radical pragmatics' tradition-
leaves me feeling like one more old radical, inexplicably still manning the 
crumbling barricades of a forgotten campaign, quaint and probably harmless if not 
entirely irrelevant, sort of like Allen Ginsberg without the beard, or Abbie 
Hoffman, only a little less dead. So what better way to celebrate the revival of our 
semantic rites of spring that to survey the utterance interpretation scene by 
hauling out the tired old bones of the traditional radical line on what is said and 
what is unsaid? 
The new traditionalism 
One advantage accruing to the sponsor of a Brand X theory is partial 
immunity from having to dwell on the specs of the product. But to situate us in 
the appropriate domain, I'll begin by recalling that on my analysis (Horn 1972, 
1973; cf. Gazdar 1979, Hirschberg 1985, Hom 1989: Chapter 4, Wainer & Maida 
1990, and Iwafiska 1992 on formalization), what is SAID in the use of a weak 
scalar value like those in boldface in the sentences of (1) is the lower bound ( ... at 
least n ... ), with the upper bound ( ... at most n ... ) IMPLICATED as a cancellable 
inference generated by the maxim of quantity (more on which below). 
(1) Scalar predication !-SIDED READING ~ 2-SIDED READING 
a. Max has 3 children. ' ... at least 3...' '... exactly 3.. .' 
b. You ate some of the cookies. '... some if not all .. .' '... some but not all...' 
c. It's possible she'll win. ' ... at least 0.. .' '...0 but not certain ...' 
d. Maggie is patriotic or quixotic. '... and perhaps both' ·... but not both' 
e. It's warm out. ' ... at least warm...' '... but not hot...' 
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Thus there is no semantic ambiguity on the lexical or sentential level, 
contrary to e.g. Aristotle's view (cf. also Burton-Roberts 1984) that possible is 
homonymous between the lower-bounded one-sided reading ('at least possible', 
'not impossible') and the lower- and upper-bounded two-sided reading ('at least 
and at most possible', 'neither impossible nor necessary'), and to analogous 
claims on some by Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh, on the cardinals by Steven 
Smith, and so on. These were, in short, no straw men I sought to slay with 
Grice's Modified Occam's Razor in one hand ('Senses are not to be multiplied 
beyond necessity') and the pragmatic principle of strength or quantity in the other. 
This latter weapon, essential to any monoguist treatment of scalar values, has 
been retooled over the years---in a recent paper (Horn 1990a), I explored its roots, 
touching on the version in (2), among others. 
(2) Quantity maxim (Strength rule, etc.) 
Strawson 's GENERAL RULE OF LINGUISTIC CONDUCT (I 952: 178-9), but with 
acknowledgments to 'Mr H.P. Grice': 
One should not make the (logically) lesser, when one could truthfully 
(and with greater or equal clarity) make the greater claim. 
Grice's 'first shot' (1961: 132): 
One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one 
unless there is a good reason for so doing. 
Grice's [FIRST] MAXIM OF QUANTITY (1967/1975: 45): 
Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the talk-exchange). 
Fogelin's RULE OF STRENGTH (1967: 20): 
Make the strongest possible claim that you can legitimately defend! 
O'Hair's version of the strength rule (1969: 45) 
Unless there are outweighing good reasons to the contrary, one should 
not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one if the audience 
is interested in the extra information that would be conveyed by the 
latter. 
Hamish's MAXIM OF QUANTITY-QUALITY (1976: 362): 
Make the strongest relevant claim justifiable by your evidence. 
Clearly, an idea whose time had come. For Grice, the methods of radical 
pragmatics were put to the service of defending a conservative semantics, one 
with truth-conditional operators analyzed very much in the classical Russellian 
way, with the gap between what that logic gives us and what we seem to need 
bridged by the assumption that speaker and hearer are in this business together, a 
business conducted under the banner of the Cooperative Principle and the 
attendant maxims. Quantity-based scalar implicature-my inviting you to infer 
from my use of some ... that for all I know not a/1...-is driven in particular by 
your knowing (and my knowing your knowing) that I expressed a weaker proposi-
tion when I could have, but chose not to, use a no more formally marked utterance 
that would have expressed a stronger proposition, one that would have unilaterally 
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entailed the one I did express. The pragmatic, context-dependent nature of this 
inference is standardly supported by invoking contexts in which it disappears. 
Some recent cancellation instances appear in (3): 
(3) Now you see it, now you don't 
a. 	 If you want to compare two languages, it helps to know one of them. 
(attributed to L. Bloomfield; cf. Hockett 1978) 
b. 	 -How many months have 28 days? 
-All of them. 
(Cited in G. G. Pocheptsov, Language and Humour, Kiev 1974) 
c. 	 'This changes everything', a startled Mr. Dumas told the Spanish envoy  
when he showed him the photocopies of the Araquistain documents.  
'You of course have the originals?' the lawyer asked casually. 'Not  
all of them', replied Mr. Fernandez Quintanilla, not lying but not  
telling the truth, either.  
(N.Y. Times article, 1991, recounting 'an elaborate bluff successfully run 
by diplomat F.Q. to convince Picasso's lawyer that he (F.Q.) possessed the 
crucial documents to prove Spain was legal owner of Guemica mural; in 
fact, however, F.Q. had NONE of the originals, only copies) 
d. 	 Like the author, I have lost 'few friends' to AIDS. (In fact, I have lost 
none.) Yet one need not have suffered any personal losses from AIDS 
to recognize... (letter to the editor, N.Y. Times 10/19/90, A34) 
The cancellability of the upper bound of scalar predications, along with the 
calculability of the inference by the Quantity or Strength maxim, testifies to its 
status as a conversational implicatum, rather than either as part of truth-
conditional content (what is said) or as a non-truth-conditional component of 
conventional meaning. Given the Gricean field of play laid out as in (4), the 
relevant distinctions within the traditional catechism are reproduced in (5): 
(4) 	 WHAT IS MEANT 
WI-IATIS~SAID -----WHAT IS IMPLICATED 
(truth-conditional ~ ~ 
aspects of meaning) CONVENTIONALLY non-conventionally 
CONVERSATIONALLY 	 non-----	"" / ~ conversationally 
generalized particularized 
conversational conversational 
implicatures implicatures 
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(5) CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATA CONVERSATIONAL IMPUCATA 
a. Make no contribution lo truth conditions, but constrain appropriateness of 
expressions with which they are associated. 
b. Unpredictable, arbitrary pan of Natural concomitant of what is 
meaning; must be learned ad hoc. said or how it is said; NON. 
CONVENTIONAL by definition. 
c. NON-C ANCELABLE; apply in all CANCELADLE, explicitly (by 
contexts of utterance. ling. context) or implicitly 
(by extraling. context) 
d. 	 DETACHABLE: two synonyms may NON-DETACHABLE if arising 
have different conventional via content maxims; 
implicata detachable if arising via 
Maxim of Manner. 
e. NOT CALCULABLE through any CALCULABLE through 
procedure; must be stipulated. Cooperative Principle and the 
Maxims of Conversation. 
But if the upper bound is implicated and not said, how is it that it may come 
under the scope of logical operators, and in particular of negation? While 
negating the sentences in (l) usually denies their lower bound, we must also 
account for the data in (6), where it is the upper bound that comes under attack. 
(6)a. This Birthday Card is NQI from one of your admirers! 
It's from TWO of your admirers. Happy Birthday From Both of Us! 
(outer and inner text respectively of Hallmark card) 
b. SOME men aren't chauvinists-ALL men are chauvinists. 
c. 	 Chris didn't manage to solve SOME of the problems-he managed to 
solve ALL of them. 
Of course, here the new traditionalist will seek to assimilate those ill-behaved 
cases to the broader phenomena of METALINGUISTIC NEGATION 1, a device for 
objecting to a previous utterance of any grounds whatever, including its phonetic 
or morphological form as in (7), its register or style as in (8), or its focus, point of 
view, or connotative meaning as in (9): 
(7)a. (-So, you [mt1antjd] to solve the problem.) 
-No, I didn't [nn¾irttTI to solve the problem-I [mfoiJd] to solve 
the problem. 
1Cf. Hom 1985, Hom 1989: Chapter 6; for critical commentary on 'metalinguistic negation', sec 
now CarslOII 1985a, Kempson 1986, Burton-Robert~ 1989, Hom 1990b, Mccawley 1990, Seuren 
1990, Sweetser 1990, Foolen 199 I. van der Sandt 1991, Wiehe 1991, and lwanska 1992. 
b. 	 He didn't call the [POiis], he called the [poLIS]. (gratia Andy Rogers) 
c. 	 I didn't trap two monGEESE-I trapped two monGOOSes. 
d. 	 (-Esker too ah cooPA Y luh veeAND?)  
-Non,je n'ai pas 'cooPAY !uh veeAND': j'ai coupe la viande.  
(8) a. Now, Cindy, dear, Grandma would like you to remember that you're a 
young lady: Phydeaux didn't 'shit the rug', he soiled the carpet. 
b. 	 Grandpa isn't feeling lousy, Johnny, he's just a tad indisposed. 
c. 	 We didn't make love-we fucked. 
d. 	 It's not stewed bunny, honey, it's civet de lapin. 
(9) a. Ben Ward is not a black Police Commissioner but a Police 
Commissioner who is black. (N. Y. Times editorial, 1/8/83) 
b. 	 I'm not his daughter-he's my father. 
c. 	 I'm not HIS brother-HE's MY brother. 
d. 	 She is not Lizzy, if you please-she's Her Imperial Majesty. 
e. 	 For a pessimist like you, the glass isn't half full-it's half empty. 
f. 	 I'm not a TrotskyITE, I'm a TrotskyIST. 
g. 	 They're not the best at what they do-they're the only ones who do 
what they do. (music critic on The Grateful Dead) 
h. 	 Winning isn't everything-it's the only thing. 
(attributed to football coach Vince Lombardi) 
i. 	 They weren't people, Sir, they were the enemy. 
(Lt. William Calley, on My Lai massacre victims) 
To these examples, discussed in more detail in my earlier work, we can add the 
entries in (10): 
(lO)a. I'm not a Jew .. .l'm Jew-ish. I don't go the whole hog. 
(British neurologist/director/comedian 
Jonathan Miller, in New Yorker interview) 
b. 	 I am not 'nonwhite'; nor are my friends of Bahamian, Cape Verdian, 
Colombian, Cuban, Dominican, Jamaican, Japanese, Korean, Panamanian, 
Puerto Rican or Trinidadian descent. I, a woman of African descent, an 
African-American if you will, would never be so presumptuous as to 
characterize 'whites' as 'non-black'.. .ldentity is not 'non' anything. 
(Aleah Bacquie, letter to editor of N. Y. Times, 3/14/90) 
c. 	 'You mean he was responsible for the 1984 riots?' the Newstrack  
interviewer said, referring to Mr. Gandhi.  
Mr. Shekhar replied: 'I don't "mean" it. I know it.'  
(from N. Y. Times article, 10/22/89, 'Indian 
News Program Struggles With Censors') 
d. 'No, he was not a bisexual!' Mr. Georgie affixed an eyelash and approved 
of it in the lighted mirror. 'H. R. Loomis was omni sexual.' 
(Fennelly 1985: 83) 
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Notice in particular that implicata based on Quantity and other maxims may 
constitute the focus of negation, as in (10c,d) or the examples of (11): 
( 11 )a. 	 A: What brand of motor oil do you use? 
B [starting car engine]: Motor oil is motor oil. 
[Smoke belches out of B's exhaust.] 
Voice-over: Motor oil is definitely NOT motor oil. 
(Quantity-based implicatum associated with tautologies; 
cf. Ward & Hirschberg 1991) 
b. 	 Miss X didn't 'pnx1uce a series of sound!; that corresponded closely with 
the score of "Horne Sweet Horne"', dammit, she SANG 'l lorne Sweet 
Home', and a lovely rendition it was too! 
(Manner-base;:! implicaturn, 'Be brief' submaxirn; d. Grice 1975: 55-56) 
c. 	 Mozart's sonatas weren't for violin and piano, they were for piano and 
violin. (Manner-based irnplicaturn, 'Be orderly' subrnaxim) 
The general thesis motivatt-O hy these examples supported hy a variety of argu-
ments for why the marked instances of negation illustrated in the sentences of (6)-
(11) should receive a unified treatment2--can be given as follows (Horn 1989: 
377): 
Apparent sentence negation represents either a descriptive truth-
functional operator, taking a proposition <l> into a proposition not-<lJ (or 
a predicate P into a predicate not-P), or a metalinguistic operator 
which can be glossed 'l object to U', where U is <..Tucially a linguistic 
utterance rather than an abstract proposition. 
This last point, the non-propositional nature of marked negation, is emphasized by 
an instance of negation brought to my attention by Barbara Abbott: 
(12) [Piano student plays passage in manner µ.l 
Teacher: 	lt's not [plays passage in manner µl  
it's [plays same passage in manner µ'l.  
2 For Kantuncn & PcLCrs (1979), a 'contrndiction negation' used to reject the conventional impli-
cala (or lc:-:ical presuppositions) induced by a given lexical item like the it~ilicized wrhs in the 
sentences of (i) and (ii) 
(i) 	 I didn't rrumage to pa~s the test.: I wa~ given the answers. 
(ii) 	 I didn't happen lo be al this intersection as you were passing by: I was expecting you. 
is accounted for by assigning this 'plug' negation wide scope with respect to a conjunction of the 
entailment and convcnlional implicatum associated with the unnegated scntc11ccs. But, as noted in 
!lorn 1985, such an approach docs 1101 gc11er.1lize 10 thee morphosyntac:tic:ally and intonationally 
similar negations of the type in (6)-( 12) here, where conversational implicata and morpholog1cal, 
phonetic, stylistic, and musical representations would have to he propositionalizcd to bring them 
within the scope of a logical negation operator. 
The distinction between unmarked and marked functions of negation in 
scalar contexts was explicitly recognized by Jespersen: 
With quantitative terms .!lQ1 nearly always means 'less than' ... but 
exceptionally these combinations [.!lQ1.J.ill5.:~. not much, not three, Il.Ql 
half full, ... ] may convey another meaning; this is the case if we stress 
the word following .lli21 and give it the peculiar intonation indicative of 
contradiction, and especially, if the negation is followed by a more 
exact indication: not LU KEW ARM, but really hot; not 0:,,/CE but two or 
three times, ell'.. (Jespersen 1933: 300-1) 
Thus, given our examples in (I), we obtain the descriptive (= 'less than') nega· 
tions of (13) and the metalinguistic negations of (14): 
( 13)a. Max doesn't have 3 children. (= he has fewer than 3) 
b. You didn't eat any of the cookies. (note the some/any suppletion) 
c. It isn't possible she'll win. (= it's impossible that she'll win) 
d. Maggie is patriotic or quixotic. (= she's neither patriotic nor quixotic) 
c. It isn't warm out. (= it's Jess than wann) 
(14)a. He doesn't have 3 children, he has 4. 
b. You didn't eat some of the cookies, you ate all of them. 
c. It isn't possible she'll win, it's downright certain she will. 
d. Maggie isn't patriotic or quixotic, she's both patriotic and quixotic. 
e. It's not warm out, it's downright hot. 
Note the application of Jesperscn's features-the focal stress, the intonation 
indicative of contradiction, and the rectification--diagnostics that I have argued 
characterize metalinguistic negation, along with restrictions on polarity triggering 
and on negative incorporation. The apparent paradox signalled by the mutual 
consistency of ( I 5a,b) is resolved by taking the negation in ( 15b), as distinguished 
from that in (15c), as an instance of metalinguistic use:3 
( 15) a. l\1a.x has three children indeed, he has four. 
b. Max doesn't have three children-(*but) he has four. 
c. Max doesn'r h:ive three children, (but) he has two. 
If Max has four children he does. a fortiori, have three, but if I know he has four I 
can reject the previous claim that he has three as (not false but) insufficiently 
informative. 
Further real life negations of the upper lxiund of scalars are lis1ed in ( 16): 
'Constraints on Lhe distribution of bur as rcncctcll in these examples arc discussed in Horn 1989: 
§6.4.3. 
(16)a. Around here, we don't LIKE coffee, we LOVE it. 
(Lauren Bacall, TV commercial for High Point decaffeinated coffee) 
b. 	 That wasn't a bad year, it was HORRIBLE. 
(Reggie Jackson, on his subpar 1983 season with the Angels) 
c. 	 I'm not HAPPY he's gone----rm elated. Never has an assistant rnach  
gotten so much credit ...  
(Chicago Bears football coach Mike Ditka, on dep,rrture of fom1er 
assistant Buddy Ryan to become head coach for Eagles in 1986) 
d. 	 I have two homes and I don't dig my roots into one or the other. I dig them 
into both. ( 12-year old girl, on her joint custody, N. Y. Times. 3/25/84) 
e. It's not a car, it's a Volkswagen. (YW commercial and advertisement) 
f. 	 EN NEW HAVEN NO l\1E GUSTA. ..ME ENCANTA RADIO MUSICAL 
(Ad on rear of Connecticut Transit buses in New Haven) 
In each case, there is a sense that the speaker is inducing a contradiction on the 
first interpretive pass in order to achieve a special effect of irony or surprise. I'll 
return to this below. 
What is said-Il2}l'. 
This halcyon picture, with its pristine separation of what is said from what is 
meant, was never as pure as I have portrayed it. Even for Grice, propositional 
content is not fully fleshed out until reference, tense, and other deictic elements 
are fixed. 4 But with the development of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 
1986), expanding on earlier observations of Atlas (1979), it came to be recognized 
that the same pragmatic reasoning used to compute implicated meaning must also 
be invoked to fill out underspecified propositions where the semantic meaning 
contributed by the linguistic expression itself is insufficient to yield a proper 
accounting of truth-conditional content.5 Thus Carston ( 1985a: 6), citing the 
natural interpretation of sentences like those in (17), 
( I 7)a. The park is some distance from where I live. 
b. It'll take us some time to get there. 
argues that what is said must be computed via the Principle of Relevance. It is not 
sufficient to take the appropriate understanding of the distance or time 
communicated by the speaker to be derived as an implicatum to be read off the 
underspecified content directly contributed by linguistic meaning alone, resulting 
4Carston ( 1985a,b, 1988) secs Grice as including the resolution of ambiguity and vagueness as 
additional components in the detennination of what is said, but it's debatable whelher Grice would 
have endorsed this position. (See Atlas 1990 for discussion.) 
5Similar views were earlier put forward by Lewis (1979) in his elaboration of the notion of 
pragmatic accommodation. 
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in an existential proposition that would seem to have to be trivially true. Instead, 
the pragmatically recoverable strengthened communication comprises what is 
said, the EXPLICATURE or truth-conditional content. More generally, 'Just 
because something is pragmatically derived it is not necessarily an implicature' 
(op. cit.: 4), and indeed, cases like those in (17) represent the rule rather than the 
exception: 'There is massive pragmatic penetration of explicit content' (op.cit.: 
6). Nor does the acceptance of widespread pragmatic intrusion into propositional 
content result in an erosion of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics:6 
Linguistic semantics is autonomous with respect to pragmatics; it 
provides the input to pragmatic processes and the two together make 
propositional forms which are the input to a truth-conditional 
semantics. (Carston 1988: 176) 
Thus, both one-sided and two-sided understandings of the scalar 
predications of (la-e) are directly represented at the level of logical content. That 
no privileged status accrues to the 'at least n' understanding of cardinal 
predications in particular is illustrated by Carston through examples those below. 
(18)a. Mrs. Smith does have three children. 
b. If Mrs. Smith has no more than three children we'll all fit into the car. 
c. If Mrs. Smith has (at least) three children, she qualifies for this program. 
(19) If there are three books by Chomsky, I'll buy them all. 
(20)a. She can have 2000 calories a day without putting on weight. 
b. The council houses are big enough for families with three kids. 
The cardinal in (18) will be interpreted as either 'at most three' or 'at least three', 
depending on whether the utterance comes as a response to (18b) or (18c) 
respectively. (19), on the other hand, receives an 'exactly three' understanding. 
And the contexts in (20), based on what we know about the world, are naturally 
read as forcing 'at most n' understandings. 
One apparent dividend promised by the explicit content view of the upper-
bounding of scalar predications is that the 'paradoxical' negations of (14) and (16) 
need no longer present a problem or call for any sort of duality of negation. 
Rather, such examples 
can and naturally are interpreted as straightforward cases of descriptive 
negation. The conclusion that there is a lot more truth-conditional 
ambiguity than is contributed by the language in question is 
unavoidable. (Kempson 1988: 88) 
6A collection of apparent counterexamples to the semantic autonomy thesis was earlier exhibited 
by Gazdar (1979: 164-68), despite his celebrated advocacy of the now abandoned formula 
'Pragmatics= meaning - truth conditions'. (Cf. Kempson 1986 for related discussion.) 
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While the scalar predications of (I) are now all taken to be ambiguous, the 
ambiguity is no longer, as in the bad old days, located at the lexical level but has 
been relocated to the propositional level: what is SAID in an utterance is 
systematically underdetermined by what is UTTERED. 
While endorsing Kempson's pragmatic enrichment analysis of scalar 
predications, Carston acknowledges that the paradoxical negations of (14) have a 
strong metalinguistic or echoic flavor that renders them unreducible to ordinary 
descriptive readings. In particular, she cites the negations of (21), in which the 
explicit content required by the context takes the scalar predication in the first 
clause to be strictly lower-bounded (with or without the overt presence of 'at 
least'), but the marked, metalinguistic reading of negation is still possible and, 
given the continuation, in fact necessary. 
(21)a. You don't have to be (at least) SIXTEEN to drive a car; 
you have to be (at least) EIGHTEEN. 
b. 	 You don't need (at least) TWO A's to get into Oxford;  
you need (at least) THREE.  
Given that a straightforward descriptive analysis is contraindicated for the 
negations in (21), she concludes that 'What we have in these cases is plain 
ordinary truth-functional negation operating over an echoic use of language' 
(Carston 1985a: 17).7 But any such attempt (and see van der Sandt 1991 for a 
related one) to propositionalize not only upper-bounding implicata but the 
stylistic, connotative, and mechanical aspects of utterances that fall within the 
scope of marked negation, as in (6)-(12), would seem to be self-defeating, 
representing a kjnd of category mistake: an 'echoic use' is not the sort of beast to 
which a truth-functional operator applies. 
Cardinal Sinn ? 
Be that as it may, Carston's broadside is striking for its concentration on 
those scalar predications involving cardinals. Cardinals certainly seem to be a 
promising place to begin any brief for an explicit content approach to scalar 
predication. Indeed, as I shall argue briefly and somewhat programmatically here, 
while a strong case can be made for an enrichment analysis of the meaning 
7The notion of echoic negation itself is in nc-Cd of clarification, since some of our clearly non-
propositional examples (e.g. (7) and (12)) require a purely utterance-based notion of echo, while 
others, as in (i), demand a certain degre,e of propositionalizing, at least insofar as deixis and tense 
are concerned. 
(i) 	A: So, I heard you were Robbie's brother.  
B 1 : I'm not HlS brother, HE·s 1'1Y brother! (=(9c))  
B2: ~You weren't HIS brother, HE was YOUR brother! 
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contribution of the cardinals, it does not extend in any linear fashion to other 
scalar values. 
First, as Sadock (1984: 142-43) has observed, a minimalist (Grice-Hornian) 
theory of the cardinals will encounter insuperable difficulty when applied to the 
truth conditions of such mathematical statements as 2 + 2 3 or The square root 
of 9 is 2, each of which would have a true reading on the 'at least' understanding 
of the cardinals involved (2 plus 2 is not only 3-it' s 4! ). It is plausible, as Atlas 
(1990) has suggested, that mathematical values are simply lexically distinct from 
the corresponding numeral words of natural language, which themselves are 
unspecified as among their 'exactly n', 'at least n', and 'at most n' values. 
Another special property associated with the cardinals but not the 'inexact' 
quantificational values is the context-induced reversibility of the scales induced, 
as illustrated in Carston's examples in (18) and (20) but also acknowledged in 
some from Hom 1972, reproduced here for their historic value: 
(22)a. Arnie is capable of breaking 70 on this course, if not { 65/*7 5}. 
b. 	 U.S. troop strength in Vietnam was down to 66,300, thus exceeding 
Mr. Nixon's pledge of 69,000. 
c. That bowler is capable of a round of at least 100. [and maybe even I 10] 
d. That golfer is capable of a round of at least 100. [and maybe even 90) 
Context-induced scale reversal is also discussed by Hirschberg (1985: §5.1.4) and 
Koenig (1991); the key point, however, is that these effects do not extend to the 
inexact scalar values: 'it does not seem possible to use some, for example, in such 
a way as to implicate "at most some"' (Sadock 1984: 143). 
A related factor affecting the interpretation of cardinals but not extending to 
other scalars is the role of approximation. / have $200 is far more likely to be 
read on its non-upper-bounded, minimal reading than is its unrounded counterpart 
I have $201 .37, where Quantity interacts crucially with the Maxim of Relation: 
(Horn 1972: 45; cf. also Sadock 1977, Wachtel 1980 on the pragmatics of 
approximation). 
Even when a traditional scalar line on the cardinals does seem tenable, it 
largely disappears under incorporation (Hom 1972: 37-8; cf. Hirschberg 1985: 
§5.1.4, Atlas 1990). Ann-sided figure is one that is semantically constrained to 
have exactly (not at least) n sides. Thus, a square may count as a figure with three 
sides but it does not thereby qualify as a three-sided figure, much less as (at least) 
a triangle. A triple (three-base hit) is not (at least) a double (two-base hit), 
although the list of players with two base hits in a game may include those with 
three. Nor do we reckon a piece Schubert composed for eight wind instruments 
among his quartets. 
Atlas (1990: 7-9) argues persuasively that the 'exactly n' interpretation of 
incorporated cardinals is to be linked to the collective or group readings which 
themselves systematically exclude minimalist treatment. This extends to the 
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reading of Carston's (19) above, as Atlas points out, citing the contrast between 
that sentence and its distributive (and scalar-implicating) counterpan: 
(23)a. 	 If there are three books by Chomsky in the shop, I'll buy them all. [ = (19)] 
b. If there are three books by Chomsky in the shop, I'll buy each of them. 
Koenig independently notes the 'exactly n' interpretation of sentences like Three 
boys carried a sofa up the stairs (*infactfour) and comes to the same conclusion: 
'only distributed readings of count phrases give rise to scalar implicatures' 
(Koenig 1991: 4).8 
But once again this correlation, valid as is it for the cardinals, does not 
readily generalize to the other scalars. Nor does the correlation of focus 
intonation with non-monotone cardinal readings observed in work by Fretheim 
(1991) and Rubinoff (1987). Fretheim notes that in response to A's query in (24), 
the B1 response is compatible with an 'at least' reading, as the continuation 
indicates, but the B2 response must be taken as SAYING, and not just 
IMPLICATING, that B has exactly three children. 
(24) 	 A: How many children do you have? 
B t: I have three children. (...In fact I have four.) 
B2: Three. ( ... #In fact four.) 
Along the same lines, Campbell (1981: 97-99) notes that the upper-
bounding irnplicamm derived in the context of (25) is CRYPTIC or automatic, 
requiring 'no real conscious effort' on A's part (as to whether B meant 'exactly 
two' or 'at least two'), while the context in (25') suggests that the addressee 
applies a PHENIC or conscious inferential mechanism to determine whether an 
irnplicature is present. 
(25)A: How many children do you have? (25')A: Do you have two children? 
B: Two. 	 B1: No, I have three. 
B2: Yes, in fact I have three. 
While I have suggested (Hom 1989: 251-52) that Campbell's cryptic/phenic 
distinction might be subsumed within the descriptive scope of Morgan's notion of 
SHORT-CIRCUITED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE (Morgan 1978), an alter-
native account would take B's response in (i) to build upper-bounding into what is 
said as part of the EXplicature. 
Once again, however, the facts change when we shift to other scalars: 
8Toe most detailed formal treaunent of the enrichment of content by uniqueness is due to Kadmon 
(1987, 1990), who provides an account of how upper-bounding can be accommodated into the 
discourse representation structure associated with a given utterance if the context-and in 
particular the presence of a definite anaphoric pronoun--requires. 
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(26)A: 	 Do you have two children? (26')A: Are many of your friends linguists? 
B1: No, three. B1: ?No, all of them. 
B2: ?Yes, (in fact) three. B2: Yes, (in fact) all of them. 
Further, notice that a bare 'No' answer, sans rectification, is compatible with a 
non-monotone ('exactly n') reading in (26) given an appropriate context, but 
never in (26'), where an unadorned negative response can only be understood as 
conveying 'less than many'. 
Similarly, if (le) were really propositionally ambiguous, there is no obvious 
reason why a 'No' response to the question 'ls it warm?' should not be 
interpretable as a denial of the enriched, two-sided content and thus as asserting 
that it's either chilly or hot, nor any non-ad hoc account of why we cannot (at 
least as adults) use the comparative in 'It's getting warmer' to denote 'less hot' 
instead of 'less cold'. Such paradigms suggest that scalar (non-cardinal) 
adjectives are indeed lower-bounded by their literal content and upper-bounded, 
if at all, by implicature. 
In sum, while we can accept Atlas's argument (1990: 15) that 'only in the 
context of an NP does a numeral modifier have a meaning', no analogous 
conclusion follows for the full range of scalar values. The signs point to a mixed 
theory in which sentences with cardinals may well submit naturally to a post-
Gricean pragmatic enrichment analysis of what is said, while other scalar 
predications continue to submit happily to a neo-Gricean minimalist implicature-
based treatment. 
The said and the meant 
The distinction between the said and the meant, and thus between the said 
and the implicated (the unsaid-but-meant), has a long and distinguished history, 
one which dates back at least to the fourth century, when rhetoricians 
characterized litotes, the figure of pragmatic understatement, as a figure in which 
we say less but mean more (cf. Horn 1991 for discussion): 
...figura est litotes, quae fit, quotiescumque minus dicimus et plus signifi-
camus, per contrarium intelligentes (Servius, cited in Hoffmann 1987: 29) 
...minus ... dicit quam significat (Donatus, cited in Hoffmann 1987: 28) 
Somewhat more recently, as we have seen, the Londoners and their allies have 
redrawn the map on which the territories of the said and the implicated are 
plotted. The determination of what is said is now recognized as a far more 
complex and crucially pragmatic matter than on the standard Gricean cartography. 
In a recent paper, Recanati takes another look at scalar predication and seeks to 
open a new front against the embattled traditionalists on behalf of the trans-
Channel consortium. I cite the relevant passage in full: 
176 
Everytxxiy would agree that the saying/implicating distinction is part of 
the ordinary, everyday picture of linguistic communication. We 
commonly talk of what is 'said' as opposed to what is 'implicated' by 
means of a certain utterance, and it is that distinction which Grice 
undertook to elaborate ... [But] when the domain of Grice's theory of 
implicatures was extended far beyond our intuitive reach, this was 
hardly noticed, let alone considered to raise a problem. Not many 
people have observed that Grice's theory departs from our intuitions 
when it is applied to examples such as 'John has three children', which 
Griceans take to express the proposition that John has at least three 
children and to implicate that he has no more than three children. 
However, there is an important difference between this example and e.g. 
'I've had no breakfast today', which implicates that the speaker is 
hungry and wishes to be fed. In the latter example, the implicature is 
intuitively felt to be external to what is said; it corresponds to something 
that we would ordinarily take to be 'implied'. In the former case, we are 
not pre-theoretically able to distinguish between the alleged two 
components of the meaning of the utterance-the proposition expressed 
(that John has at least three children) and the implicature (that he has at 
most three children). We are conscious only of their combination, i.e. of 
the proposition that John has exactly three children. In this case ... , the 
theoretical distinction between the proposition expressed and the 
implicature does not correspond to the intuitive distinction between 
what is said and what is implied. (Recanati 1989: 326) 
But just how compelling is this argument from intuition? As an avatar of 
the anti-Grice, Recanati-like Kempson, Carston, Atlas, and Koenig-judi-
ciously concentrates his fire on our weakest flank, the cardinals. An inspection of 
the literature on the scalars, in particular the weak positive (upward monotone) 
determiner some, indicates that Grice must be seen as a Paulie-come-lately to an 
unusually well-established consensus. The distinction between what an expres-
sion or its utterer SAYS and what an expression or its utterer MEANS is 
standardly evoked by nineteenth-century philosophers seeking to preserve the 
classical analysis of some against the lexical-ambiguist line urged by Sir William 
Hamilton of Edinburgh and his successors ( cf. Horn 1990a). In these passages, 
the emphasis is mine but the proto-Gricean terminology is in the original. 
In common conversation the affirmation of a part is meant to IMPLY 
the denial of the remainder. Thus, by 'some of the apples are ripe', it is 
always [sic!] INTENDED TO SIGNIFY that some are not ripe. 
(De Morgan 1847: 4) 
Some, in logic, means one or more, it may be all. He who says that 
some are, is not to held to mean the rest are not. 'Some men 
breathe' ... would be held false in common language [which] usually 
adopts the complex particular proposition and IMPLIES THAT SOME 
ARE NOT IN SAYING THAT SOME ARE. (De Morgan 1847: 56) 
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No shadow of justification is shown ... for adopting into logic a mere 
sous-entendu of common conversation in its most unprecise form. If I 
say to any one, 'I saw some of your children today', he might be justified 
in inferring that I did not see them all, NOT BECAUSE THE WORDS 
MEAN IT, but because, if I had seen them all, it is most likely that I 
SHOULD HA VE SAID SO: even though this cannot be presumed unless 
it is presupposed that I must have known whether the children I saw 
were all or not. (Mill 1867: 501) 
Whenever we think of the class as a whole, we should employ the term 
All; and therefore when we employ the term Some, IT IS IMPLIED that 
we are not thinking of the whole, but of a part as distinguished from the 
whole-that is, of a part only. (Monck 1881: 156) 
Sapir's particular propositions are also unilateral in content, picking up a bilateral 
force only as context permits: 
'Not everybody came' DOES NOT MEAN 'some came', WHICH IS 
IMPLIED, but 'some did not come'. Logically, the negated totalizer 
[not every] should include the totalized negative, i.e. opposite or con-
trary [none], as a possibility, but ORDINARILY this interpretation is 
excluded. (Sapir 1930: 21) 
A more detailed defense of this position is offered by an unfortunately obscure 
philosopher writing in an equally obscure Jesuit journal: 
WHAT CAN BE UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT BEING SAID is 
usually, in the interest of economy, NOT SAID ...A person making a 
statement in the fom1, 'Some S is P', generally WISHES TO SUGGEST 
that some S also is not P. For, in the majority of cases, if he knew that all 
S is P, he would say so ...If a person says, 'Some grocers are honest', or 
'Some books are interesting', meaning to suggest that some grocers are 
not honest or that some textbooks are not interesting, he is really giving 
voice to a conjunctive proposition in an elliptical way. 
Though this is the usual manner of speech, there are circumstances, 
nevertheless, in which the particular proposition should be understood to 
mean just what it says and not something else over and above what it 
says. One such circumstance is that in which the speaker does not know 
whether the subcontrary proposition is also true; another is that in which 
the truth of the subcontrary is not of any moment. (Doyle 1951: 382) 
So, pace Recanati, the analysis of the prototypic weak scalars as asserting a 
lower bound and suggesting or implying-Le. implicating-an upper bound as a 
contextually dependent aspect of meaning is among the more robust intuitions in 
the literature. Of course, this does not vitiate the appeal of an explicature analysis 
for a particular construction; we have observed that precisely such an approach 
seems warranted for the cardinals. We turn now to only sentences, where I shall 
argue that the adoption of an enrichment analysis allows us to arrive at a 
semantically economical account of the linguistic contribution made by only. 
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Only and {im/ex}plicature 
Through the millenia there have been two primary approaches to the 
semantics of only. The primary treatment is contained in the thirteenth century 
treatise on exponibles by Peter of Spain, on which an 'exclusive' expression with 
the syncategorematic term solus or tantum ('alone', 'only') is a conjunction that 
can be expounded (unpacked) into 'an affirmative copulative proposition whose 
first part is that to which the exclusive sign was prefixed, and whose second part 
is a negative proposition denying the predicate of all others apart from the subject' 
(Mullally 1945: 106-7). Thus (27a) entails the conjunction of (26b) and (26c). 
(27)a. Only man is rational. 
b. Man is rational. 
c. Nothing other than man is rational. 
More recent advocates of a Perrine conjunction analysis for sentences with only or 
an 'exceptive' like nothing but ... include Kuroda (1966), Lakoff (1970), Taglicht 
( 1984), Keenan & Sta vi ( 1986), Atlas (1991 ), von Fin tel (to appear), Moser 
(1992), Burton-Roberts (1992), and Krifka (1992). But does (27a) really SAY 
(27b) as well as (27c)? And is it the only that says it? Here is Peter's 
contemporary, William of Sherwood: 
It is asked why 'alone' [solus} is called an exclusive rather than an 
inclusive; for when someone says 'Socrates alone is running'. Socrates is 
included under running but the others are excluded. It must be said that 
it is because the inclusion occurs not as a result of the force of the word 
but as a result of the statement as it is before the 'alone' is inserted into 
it. The exclusion, on the other hand •... does occur as a result of the force 
of the word ['alone']. 
(Treatise on Syncategoremntic Words XI.6, in Kretzrnann 1968: 71-2) 
This suggests an asymmetric approach on which the positive proposition, 
e.g. (27b), is not said, or at least not said directly.9 Along these lines, my own 
somewhat dusty analysis can be demothballed to reveal a positive presupposition 
and a negative assertion: 
(28) 	Hom (1969): only (x=a, Fx) 
Presupposes: Fa 
~: -3y(y;ta & Fy) 
91 read Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica Ia, q. 31, arts. 3 and 4, in Pegis 1945: 311-14) as 
endorsing a similarly asymmetric position on only, although it's possible that with Peter of Spain, 
who later became Pope John XXI, among the conjunctionalist hosts, I just wam to recruit a saint to 
my side of the ledger for moral support. 
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Thus Only Muriel voted for Hubert (and doesn't that take us back?) presupposes 
that she did and asserts (and entails) that nobody else did. Crucially. (29a) is 
distinguished from the true conjunction (29b) which really does simply entail both 
its positive/(29c) and negative/(29d) components. 
(29)a. 	 Only Muriel voted for Hubert. 
b. 	 Muriel and only Muriel voted for Hubert. 
c. 	 Muriel voted for Hubert. 
d. 	 Nobody distinct from Muriel voted for Hubert. 
Indeed, one unresolved problem for any conjunctionalist account of only is how to 
explain why (29b) is distinct from (29a) and not simply redundant. 
My evidence for the essentially negative character of sentences like (29a) 
was provided by the possible and impossible continuations in (30). (To the 
original examples from Horn 1969, 1970 in (30a-e), reproduced here for their 
nostalgic value, I add the new ones in (f-h) with the expectation that the current 
paper will seem equally dated in another 23 years.) 
(30)a. 	-Did only Muriel vote for Hubert? 
-No. (Lyndon did too/#she didn't). 
b. 	 -Only Muriel voted for Hubert.  
-No, that's not true: (Lyndon did too/#she didn't/#nobody did).  
c. 	 Only John smoked the pot, \if even he did/and maybe even he didn't.}1 
#if nobody else did.  
#and/but maybe someone else did.  
d. 	 Nobody but Nixon is worthy of contempt, and possibly even he isn't. 
e. 	 Everybody but Nixon is worthy of salvation, and possibly even he is too. 
f. 	 Only Hillary would ever trust Bill. 
g. 	 Only if he runs against George would I vote for Bill. 
h. 	 60% of the men { but/?and Jonly 40% of the women voted for George. 
The argument here (Horn 1969: 105; cf. also Ducrot 1973 on the scale-reversing 
properties of seulement) is that entailment (as reflected in constraints on 
cancellation or suspension), polarity effects, and monotonicity diagnostics (cf. 
Barwise & Cooper 1981) are determined by the assertion alone-what is said-
and not by what is presupposed or implicated. 
A similar analysis is proposed in Horn 1979, except that the positive or 
existential component (e.g. (29c)) is now taken to follow from the only sentence 
by CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURE ala Grice 1975 and Karttunen & Peters 1979, 
rather than representing a truth-value-gap inducing logical presupposition. Rooth 
(1985) adopts the same line, although he disregards the implicated component in 
the implementation of his semantics. Data like those in (31), applying Karttunen-
Peters-type diagnostics to only sentences, 
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(31 )a. 	 ff only Hillary trusts Bill, all is well. 
b. I just discovered that only Hillary trusts Bill. 
c. It's too bad that only Hillary trusts Bill. 
d. I know Hillary trusts Bill, but does ONLY Hillary trust BilJ? 
e. #I know nobody besides Hillary trusts Bill, but does only Hillary trust Bill? 
suggest that Only Hillary trusts Bill does indeed (at most) conventionally 
implicate, and not say, that Hillary trusts Bill. The fact that the positive 
proposition falls outside the scope of the assertion in each case reinforces the view 
that we are dealing with a non-truth-conditional aspect of conventional 
meaning.10 But are we? Or is a more unconventional analysis called for? 
A rigidly minimalist stance on only is advocated by Geach (1962: 187), for 
whom there is NO relation between the only expression and its positive counter-
part. Thus 'F (some a)' is not deducible from 'F (only a)' either as an entailment 
or as a non-truth-conditional aspect of conventional force. Geach's argument for 
this analysis from logical convenience-'lt is formally much more convenient to 
treat the exclusive proposition as having precisely the exclusive force of its 
supposed second [negative] component'-appears to fly in the face of intuition, 
entailing as it does that Only the President can rectify the Rodney King verdict is 
true on the grounds that NOBODY can rectify the Rodney King verdict. But what 
if we can derive the positive proposition as a CONVERSATIONAL implicature? 
All things equal, we should prefer a Geach-type account. An appeal to 
conventional implicature is an admission of analytic defeat, suggesting that the 
lexical semantics could be otherwise: conventional implicata may be implicata, 
but they are also conventional. In fact, though, we've seen that the positive 
component of a sentence with an exclusive or exceptive can be cancelled in 
context (recall (30c,d,e)) 11, and as (32) shows, the implicature in question appears 
to be non-detachable as well, two arguments for its non-conventional status. 
(32) 	 Only Democrats support Brown. 
Nobody { but/except/other than) Democrats support Brown. 
To make the case, however, we need a demonstration of calculability: how 
can the positive component of only sentences be derived as a conversational 
implicatum? Here we follow an argument of McCawley (1981: 226), as well as 
IOif the semantics of only if are compositional, they reinforce the conclusion that the positive 
proposition is not entailed, or p only ifq would be equivalent 10 p if and only if q, which it clearly 
is not: /'ll go (#if and) only ifyou do and maybe not even then. But the distinction between only 
ifand ifand only if is parallel to that between only linguists and linguists and only linguists. 
110r the classic exceptive in (i), 
(i) All the world is quee.r save me and thee, and sometimes I think thee is a little queer. 
attributed by Bartlett et al. to ·an imidentified Quaker speaking to his wife'. As in the other 
examples of felicitous cancellation, the presence of an epistemic qualifier is essential. 
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independent suggestions along the same lines by de Mey ( 199 I) and Hoeksema 
(1991): it is pointless to weaken a statement predicating something universally if 
you know that the predication holds for the excepted elements as well. If you 
know--0r even strongly suspect-that NOBODY supports Brown, (32) is a pretty 
silly way of conveying this. Note in addition that (32) does not implicate that 
Democrats support Brown, but only that some do. 
The key here lies in the converse relation between only and all, recognized 
by the medievals ('Tantum animal est homo ergo omnis homo est animal': 
Peter/Mullally 1945: 106-7) and more recently exploited by Lobner (I 987) and de 
Mey (1991). To say that only Democrats support Brown is to say that all Brown 
supporters are Democrats. But, as has been recognized for a couple of millenia 
(cf. Horn 1989: §1.1.3 for discussion), there is an existential inference, generally 
assumed to hold non-logically, that is typically associated with universals. Thus 
we can pragmatically infer that there are indeed Brown supporters; otherwise the 
all-statement would be informationally vacuous and hence pointless to assert. But 
now we obtain that conclusion that there are indeed Democrats who support 
Brown, which is the strongest positive proposition licensed by (32). Another way 
to put the same point is that it's just as true, but just as uncooperative, to assert 
(32) if you know that nobody supports Brown as it is to assert that all Jack's 
children are bald on the grounds that Jack is childless. 
Thus I claim that whenever something is predicated of an entire contrast set 
with a specified excluded or excepted subset, the complementary property is 
conversationally implicated to hold of the exception, modulo assumptions of 
relevance and knowledge. This position is reminiscent (at least to me) of one 
defended elsewhere (in Horn 1981) advocating that the cleft in (33a), while 
conventionally implicating the backgrounded existential proposition in (33b), 
does not conventionally implicate (33c) or (33d), contra Halvorsen 1978, and does 
not entail or assert (33c), contra Atlas & Levinson I981 (and now Aissen 1992: 
50-51). 
(33)a. It was a pizza that Mary ate. 
b. Mary ate something. 
c. Mary ate nothing (within the context set) other than a pizza. 
d. Mary ate at most one thing (within the context set). 
Rather, as the non-detachability paradigm in (34) indicates, 
(34 )a. What Mary ate was a pizza. [psuedo-cleft] 
b. The thing that Mary ate was a pizza. [th-cleft] 
c. Mary ate a PIZZA. [focus intonation] 
d. A PIZZA, Mary ate. [focus- or Y-movement] 
the exhaustiveness premise associated with clefts and other focus constructions is 
derivable as a generalized conversational implicature. That is, 
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The utterance in context C of any sentence which entails Fa and 
conventionally implicates 3 x(Fx) will induce a generalized 
conversational implicature to the effect that -3x(x;,ea & Fx), where the 
variable x ranges over entities determined by C. (Horn 1981: 134) 
Without going through the details of that argument (cf. Vallduvi 1990 for a recent 
concurring opinion), I shall merely note here that on the account proposed here, 
(35b) does not follow from (35a) by virtue of semantics, just as (35d) does not 
follow from (35c). 
(35)a. 	 I love only you. 
b. I love you. 
c. I love YOU. 
d. I love nobody distinct from you. 
That is, J love only you is not a declaration of love nor I love you a declaration of 
fidelity, but the recipient in each case is pragmatically licensed to hope for the 
best. 
Unfortunately for the symmetry of this picture and for the simplicity of the 
story proposed for only here, there are contexts in which an only sentence does 
seem to entail both of its components, as on the Petrine conjunction analysis: 
(36)a. 	 Mary will be upset if only Bill makes it to her dinner party. 
b. I bet you $10 that only Kim passes the test. 
c. Guess what: only Kim passed the test! 
The contrast with the well-behaved implicata of even sentences is especially 
striking; in the parallel examples of (37) the scalar and existential implicata 
remain properly outside the scope of what is said. 
(37)a. 	 Mary will be upset if even Bill makes it to her dinner party. 
b. I bet you $10 that even Kim passes the test. 
c. Guess what: even Kim passed the test! 
Thus if Kim passes the test, the speaker of (37b) wins the bet, if not not, 
regardless of whether others passed or whether Kim's success was particularly 
surprising.12 What of (36b), though? If everyone flunked, no amicable 
12<:>n the standard Kannmen-Peters type analysis of even (Kantunen & Peters 1979: 23-33; cf. 
also Fraser 1971, Hom 1971), (i) conventionally implicates both (ii) and (iii). 
(i) Even Kim passed the test 
(ii) There are other x under consideration besides Kim such that x passed the test. 
(iii) 	 For all x under consideration besides Kim, the likelihood that x passed the test is greater 
than the likelihood that Kim passed the test 
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settlement of the wager is at hand. Similarly, in (363-), Mary may just be 
apprehensive about an evening alone with Bill; if no one shows up at all she will 
happily pop a meal in her microwave and a tape in her VCR. 
The problem is that on the natural interpretation of the sentences of (36), 
contrary to what we found earlier, only a ... does indeed get interpreted as 
SAYING a and only a.. .B What we need here is precisely a Sperber-Wilson-
Kempson-Carston type analysis in which the positive component, while not 
constituting pan of the linguistic meaning contributed by only, DOES enter into 
the determination of what is said, the enriched propositional content. I submit that 
an asymmetric theory of the conventional meaning of only in the spirit of William 
of Sherwood and of Geach, combined with a Gricean approach to the positive or 
existential component and with a London-style account of the apparently 
recalcitrant cases, provides the most natural and least stipulative treatment of the 
full range of data.14 
I would maintain, however, that only the latter imp!icaturc need be stipulated as conventional. 
First, the non-uniqueness inference in (ii) can be suaightforwardly derived from Ille use of an 
expression that induces the scalar implicature in (iii) while making no other contribution to the 
content of the sentence in which it occurs. But in addition, Kamunen & Peters's 'existential 
implicature' can be cancel led in the appropriate context, such as the one observed by Bruce Fraser 
(p.c., 1971): 
(iv) Come on, Chris, eat up-even Jiu.le Billy finished his cereal. 
(iv) can be ultered by a parent to an older child without implicating that anyone otJ1er than little 
Billy has eaten his cereal, provided that Billy is the less likely of the set of two to have done so. lf 
Lhis reanalysis is tenable, one more putative conventional implicature bites the dust 
13Somctimes this intended strengthening is not directly apparent to the beholder. I had to read a 
recent headline 'Lenin Belongs Only in a Museum-or Does He?' more than once to realize that 
the question had to do with whether Lenin belongs EVEN in a museum. 
140ne crucial aspect of the context in detern1ining the content of only expressions is the semantic 
type of the focus of only. De Mey (1991: 102-4) acknowledges that the pure conversational line 
he tentatively cndor~s for the existential proposition is most convincing for CN subjects like (i), 
less so for proper names as in (ii), and least of all for cardinal foci as in (iii); an epistemological 
account of the difference seems plausible, but I cannot pursue this here. 
0) Only students (if anybody at all) read book.~. 
(ii) Only John (if anybody at all) slept. 
(iii) Only three pilot~ (if anybody at all) slept 
For William of Sherwood, too, tJ1c trutJ1-conditions of an only sentence will depend on the context, 
but he is particularly sensitive to the effect of distributive vs. group readings of only n subjects, 
pointing out (Kretzmann 1968: 95) that while generally, 'If one says "only three", one cannot infer 
"therefore not two", but instead "therefore not four or five"', as in (iv), 
tiv) Only three are running.  
( v J Only three arc hauling the boaL  
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The Cloud of Unsaying 
In the cases examined so far, what is said is contrasted with what is meant 
without being said: some things must be said, some things are better left unsaid. 
But there are also those things that a speaker must unsay. It is to this reversative 
category of the unsaid that we now tum. 
We observed rather briefly above the double processing effect associated 
with some examples of marked negation 15, an effect emerging even more clearly 
in the opening paragraph of a late 1984 New York Times op-ed column by 
television news commentator John Chancellor, in which what is said must first be 
constructed and then, when the final sentence is reached, deconstructed: 
When Ronald Reagan carried 49 states and won 525 electoral votes, it 
was not an historic victory. Walter F. Mondale's poor showing wasn't 
an historic defeat. Mr. Mondale's choice of Geraldine A. Ferraro as his 
running mate wasn't an historic decision, either. None of these was an 
historic event. Each was a historic event. 
Only the rectification forces this reanalysis, in which what is said must 
retroactively be unsaid. A parallel instance occurs in a passage from Othello 
(III.iv) in which the words Bianca puts into Cassia's mouth 
both upper and lower bound are excluded in (v), which can only be read as saying that exactly 
three are engaged in boat-hauling. The link between propositional enrichment and group read.ings 
with only recalls the parallel correlation for basic cardinal predications observed earlier. 
151 have argued elsewhere (Hom 1989: 484-90, Hom 1990: 496ff.) that the set of metalinguistic 
negations inducing double processing is not truth-conditionally homogeneous, contra Burton-
Roberts 1990 (and vitiating the criticism in Wiehe 1991). In just those instances in which the the 
focus of negation involves a truth condition for the corresponding affirmative, including in 
particular the primal datum, 
(i) The king ofFrance is not bald. [as uttered post 1870] 
the very act of issuing a METALINGUISTIC negation suffices to render the sentence true as a 
DESCRIPTIVE negation. Thus, even though such a denial is most naturally uttered as an echoic 
objection to an earlier positive assertion, it differs from our earlier examples in that no truth-
conditional contradiction arises in the processing of the negative utterance. When the objection 
focuses on a conventional implicatum that is NOT a truth condition of the affirmative, as in the 
examples in Note 2 above, Oil the other hand, the use of metalinguistic negation fails to guarantee 
the truth of the corresponding descriptive negation. The disunity of the class of metalinguistic 
negations is demonstrate..! by the distribution of because clauses, where infelicity results only 
when an utterance is objected to on purely non-truth-conditional growids: 
(ii) The king of France isn't bald, (because) there is oo king of France. 
(iii) I'm oot his brother, (#because) he's my brother! 
(iv) I didn't trap two monGEESE, (#because) I trapped two monGOOScs. 
(v) Grandpa isn't feeling lousy, Johnny, (#because) he's just indisposed. 
Cf. Bunon-Roberts 1989: 237 and Hom 1990b: 499-SOO for two sides to this story. 
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Cassio: Leave me for this time. 
Bianca: Leave you? Wherefore? 
Cassio: I do attend here on the general 
And think it no addition, nor my wish 
To have him see me womaned. 
Bianca: 	 Why, I pray you? 
Cassio: Not that I love you not. 
Bianca: 	 But that you do not love me! 
serve to convert the descriptive negation of his protest into a quibble over do-
support: it's not that I love you not, it's that I don't love you. And when Joan 
Rivers, in an April 22, 1992 address to Yale undergraduates on 'Life in the Real 
World', reminds Yale students, 
Remember, kids. It's not who you know, it's WHOM you know. 
double processing strikes again. 
Parallel to the Chancellor, Shakespeare, and Rivers citations is the scalar 
implicature-cancelling negation in Hungarian, where Varga (I 980: 90) observes 
that contrarily to the ordinary lower-bound-denying negation of (38a), 
(38)a. 'Nern 'olyan gyorsan gepel mint te. 'He doesn't type as fast as you' 
not as fast types as you (=he types more slowly) 
b. 	 'Nern volyan gyorsan gepel mint te, 'He doesn't type as fast as you, 
hanem 'gyorsabban. but faster' 
the marked negative utterance in (38b) 
may have a surprising or humorous effect (because it contradicts our 
pragmatic expectations mobilized by the first part of the sentence), but is 
perfectly acceptable ... The lower-value ['less than'] interpretation 
prevails unless the higher-value interpretation is explicitly stated. 
Similarly, (39) is processed as 'a pragmatic contradiction ... exploited to create a 
surprising and/or humorous effect'. 
(39) 'Nern volyan magas 0, mint te, hanem 'sokkal 'magasabb 0. 
not as tall is as you but much taller is 
'He isn't as tall as you, he's much taller' 
This sense of irony, surprise, or humorous affect accompanying the double 
processing induced here is worth stressing. Earlier accounts of metalinguistic or 
marked negation, like Jespersen's (cited above) or mine, as when I comment that 
'There is a procedural sense in which the descriptive use is primary: 
the ... metalinguistic understanding is typically only available on a "second pass", 
when the descriptive reading self-destructs' (Horn 1989: 444), fail to deal 
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adequately with this affect and hence to assimilate the marked negations of these 
cases to other modes of ironic unsaying. Yet the effect is not surprising, 
especially in the light of the echoic theory of irony (Sperber & Wilson 1986). 
To illustrate, I'll consider three distinct devices for triggering ironic 
reprocessing. First, as we see in (40), the formula 'No X, no Y' may be filled 
in--depending on context and contour--either conjunctively or conditionally: 
(40) a. 	 No retreat, no surrender. No smoking, No drinking. (<p & 'If) 
b. No pain, no gain. No tickee, no washee. (<p ----) 'If) 
Even here, the context is paramount in determining context: 'No vegetables, no 
dessert' will be taken as a conditional or a conjunction depending on whether it's 
uttered as a parent's warning or a maitre d's apology. But the sign posted on the 
Yale Commons cafeteria door reproduced in (41) must first be assigned 
conditional content; only at the bottom does this content get erased and replaced 
by that of a loony conjunction. 
(41) 	 NO SHIRT, NO SHOES 
NO SERVICE 
ALSO-NO SKATES 
But my retroactive negation of choice is the 
ubiquitous if notorious ... NOT of Wayne's World 
fame, as is now appearing on a T-shirt near you, 
to honor the local namesake on his quincentenary: 
What especially drew my attention to retro-NOT is its apparent conflict with 
the well-established functional tendency for natural language negation to precede 
its focus, even when typological syntactic considerations militate against it. This 
NEG-FIRST principle, stressed by Jespersen and exemplified in Hom 1989, is 
motivated by the tendency to signal negation as early as possible, even at the cost 
of introducing ambiguity, to forestall potentially significant misinterpretations, 
especially in directive speech acts: 'Kill hi~ops-not!' But it is precisely 
this cooperation-based motivation for EARLY negation that is exploited by the 
use of TOO-LATE negation of the garden-pathing, sarcastic genus. Thus the 
effect is quite parallel to that of the garden-variety garden-path echoic negations 
we have discussed, a parallel that especially struck me when my young son came 
out with the sequence in (42) a few months after his younger sister had hit me 
with the functionally parallel metalinguistic negation in (43): 
(42) You 're my favorite person. (pau.st) (43) I don't like you, Daddy. 
NOT! 	(shorter pau.se)Just kidding! (pau.st) I love you. 
(David H., 9:6) (Meryl H., 6:6) 
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The history of retro-NOT, incidentally, is a bit longer than Wayne and Garth 
might suggest. In (44) we have a citation from Archie Goodwin in a mid-1950's 
Nero Wolfe mystery, and in (45) and (46) instances from a pre-war juvenile 
Western noveJ 16-pre-World War I, that is--by the renowned author of Tom the 
Teleplwne Boy, Two Boy Gold Miners, and The Boy Pilot of the Lakes: 
(44) 	 I stood with my arms folded, glaring down at Nero Wolfe, who had his 
278 pounds planted in a massive armchair .. .'A FINE WAY TO 
SERVE YOUR COUNTRY', I told him. 'NOT. In spite of a late start 
I get you here in time to be shown to your room and unpack and wash 
up for dinner, and now you tell me to go tell your host you want dinner 
in your room. Nothing doing. I decline.' (Stout 1955: 54) 
(45) 	 'Larry, you and Bill build the fire and get supper ready. Horace, I'll 
put you in charge and you must arrange the place for us to sleep. I can 
see some pine trees yonder. Break off some limbs and spread them on 
the ground. Then put the blankets over them.' 
'YOU'RE A FINE COMMANDER TO BE LIEUTENANT FOR-
NOT', declared Horace. 'Gave me the meanest job of all.' Yet he lost 
no time in obeying. (Webster 1910: 68) 
(46) 	 'HE'S A FINE NEIGHBOR-NOT', declared Larry. 'I should have 
thought he would be only too glad to help your father and Mr. Snider 
get back their cattle.' (Webster 1910: 145) 
Notice that in each case the retroactive unsaying follows a previous affirmation 
involving the predicate fine, which may tip the reader off to the sarcastic intent in 
the same manner that the fall-rise contour does with metalinguistic negation. The 
recipient is warned to tread lightly on that garden path.17 
One last example: while negative parentheticals normally follow a main 
clause negation and contribute a functionally pleonastic negative-He isn't, I 
(don't) think, going to be able to make it today-the negative parentheticals in 
(47) are very much NON-pleonastic, serving (like their retro-NOT cousins) to 
unsay what was said and install its contradictory. 
16Retro-NOT seems to have a particular appeal IO children and adolescents alike. Jack Hoeksema 
informs me that in Dutch, where ordinary niet occurs in pre-verbal position in canonical SOV 
clauses, retroactive niet has been innovated, either spontaneously by his 3-year-old daughter or via 
the pre-school grapevine. His daughter contributed the da1a in (i) and {ii), where the explosive 
negative is preceded by a telltale pause, the classic invitation IO stroll down that garden path: 
(i) 	 Papa is lief-NIET! (standard Dutch: Papa is niet lief. ) 'Daddy is swecL NOT!' 
(ii) Nette moet plassen-NIET! (vs. Nette moet niet plassen.) 'Annette must pee. NOT!' 
17When the original content is itself negative, the retroactive negator cannot be NOT, but other 
alternatives are available: 
(i) 	 You don't please me when you sque.e7,e me.  
No, not much.  
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(47) 	 'Look here, kid', said R.C. [Grey's brother], 'save something for 
tomorrow.' 
In disgust Romer [Grey's son] replied, 'Well, I suppose if a flock of 
antelope came along here you wouldn't move ... YOU AN' DAD ARE 
GREAT HUNTERS, I DON'TlHINK!' 
(1918 Zane Grey memoir, Tonto Basin) 
HARRY'S A REAL GENIUS, I DON'T lHINK. (Cutler 1974: 117) 
Once again, the patently insincere superlatives signal the undoing to come. 
A final note on the fine an of unsaying. This device has a rich history in 
rhetoric. We find it mentioned by Steele in the Tatler: 
My Contemporaries the Novelists fi.e., journalists] have, for the better 
spinning out Paragraphs, and working down to the End of their Columns, 
A MOST HAPPY ART IN SAYING AND UNSAYING, giving Hints of 
Intelligence, and Interpretations of indifferent Actions, to the great 
Disturbance of the Brains of ordinary Readers. (Steele 1710: 469) 
Even more striking is Vaughn's unmasking of this black an in his mocking 
vilification of the morally corrupt Romantics and their 'doctrine of Irony': 
After advancing a paradox, or pushing a fancy to the edge of absurdity, 
let the author turn round, and abandon his own creation ... Thus, if any 
dullard begins gravely to criticise, he shall have only laughter for his 
pains, as one too gross for the perception of humour ... According to the 
Ironic theory, such SAYING AND UNSAYING IS NOT 
CONVENIENT MERELY (as a secret door of escape behind the 
tapestry), BUT IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ARTISTIC. For what is 
Art, but a sublime play? (Vaughan 1856: 346-47) 
Of course, as Spurgeon 0882: 284) reminds us, we must be on our guard, 
for IT IS SO MUCH EASIER TO SAY THAN TO UNSAY. 
NOTr 
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